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NOTE
THE NAFTA ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE
AGREEMENT AND THE POWER TO
INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION

The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),' like
other international trade instruments that have preceded it, is aimed

primarily at promoting economic growth through free trade. Its Preamble states the desire of the Parties to develop world trade by expanding and securing markets.2 These objectives are to be attained
through the elimination of barriers to trade and by facilitating crossborder movement of goods and services.3 However, the promotion of
economic growth in some instances may be diametrically opposed to
the protection of the environment. The former often requires using

natural resources for profit while the latter seeks to prevent the depletion of natural resources.4 Traditionally, environmental regulations
have been viewed as restraints on trade, even coming under attack as
violations of international trade agreements.' The tension between in-

1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 612
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Id. pmbl., at 297.
3. Id. art. 102(a), at 297.
4. James P. Duffy I1, The Environmental Implications of a North American Free
Trade Agreement, 10 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 561, 562, 600 (1993).

5. Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act in 1972 to restrict the number
of dolphins killed by U.S. fishing boats netting yellowfin tuna. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1988 & Supp. 1994); Hilary F. French, The Tuna Test: GATT and the Environment, WORLD
WATCH, Apr. 1992, at 9. Fearful that foreign vessels using fishing practices harmful to dolphins were selling their catch in U.S. markets, Congress passed amendments to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act in 1985 and 1988 to ensure that all tuna sold in U.S markets was
caught using dolphin safe techniques. French, supra at 9. The United States imposed a ban
on tuna imports from Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Vanuatu, and Venezuela for violating this
provision of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Id. Mexico challenged the Act as a violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT"). Id. at 34. For a description
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ternational trade and environmental protection makes the accommodation of environmental provisions a unique, difficult and inevitably
unsatisfying task for both free traders and environmentalists. Nonethe-

less, increased public awareness of global environmental concerns and
an emerging global economy dictate that these issues must be reconciled.
Both the NAFCA and the North American Agreement of Environmental Cooperation ("NAAEC" or environmental side agreement)6
have been lauded as unprecedented agreements, bringing environmental protection into a new era, precisely because they attempt to reconcile the tension between international trade and environmental pro-

tection.7 The NAFTA effectively cures many of the environmental

of the GAIT, see infra note 8. The GATr panel held that the provisions of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act did not fall within the scope of GAT Article XX which permits a
country to enact measures for the protection of health and the environment if the measures
are not disguised restrictions on free trade. French, supra at 34 (explaining the rationale
adopted by the GAIT panel in deciding that the Marine Mammal Protection Act violated
GATT). Mexico did not enforce the ruling of the GAT panel in order to promote its environmental image in light of the impending NAFTA negotiations. Id.; Duffy, supra note 4, at
596; Kurt C. Hofgard, Is This Land Really Our Land?: Impacts of Free Trade Agreements
on U.S. Environmental Protection, 23 ENVTL. L. 635, 639-40, 657-59 (1993); Brenda S.
Hustis, Note, The Environmental Implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 589, 617 (1993) (describing a Canadian attempt to challenge a U.S. ban
on asbestos as an unfair barrier to trade under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement).
6. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14 1993, U.S.-Can.Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
7. See Jared Blumenfeld, 1994: The Year that Regional Environmental Enforcement
Gets Tough? An Analysis of NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and Maastricht Treaty, 16
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 959 (Dec. 15, 1993):
These two agreements [NAFTA and NAAEC] open the door to a new era of regional environmental enforcement, in which, for the first time, monetary penalties
will be levied against states which violate their regional or domestic environmental
obligations. In addition, the environmental side agreement contains the unprecedented measure of subtracting NAFTA trade benefits where a state fails to pay the
original fine on time.
Id. at 959; Duffy, supra note 4, at 588 ("NAFA, if successfully implemented, will become
a model for modem 'environmentally conscious' trade policies. NAFTA, in this respect, offers
the world the revolutionary concept of 'environmental trade;' that is, a trade scheme where
markets could allocate resources to their most environmentally efficient uses, thereby achieving sustainable development."); Hustis, supra note 5, at 590 ("[NAFTA] . . . has resulted in
a trade agreement which, contrary to traditional notions of international trade policy, adopts
objectives of sustainable development and environmental protection together with the standard
goal of the elimination of trade barriers."); see also ExEcUTnvE REPORT, THE NAFTA: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL Issues 1 (1993) [hereinafter REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES]:
President Clinton . . . committed to pursue supplemental agreements to ensure that
increased trade with Mexico and Canada would not come at the expense of the
environment . ...
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lapses that exist in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") and the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement
("FTA") 9 through measures such as upward harmonization, sustainable development," requiring parties to enhance their level of envi-

This administration firmly believes, and this Report shows, that the NAFTA
and its related environmental agreements will establish precedent-setting international
mechanisms and national commitments that will make us more effective than ever
in protecting the environment of the United States and all of North America.
Id.
The above referenced Report on Environmental Issues was part of the package of
documents transmitted to Congress as additional information for the approval of NAFTA.
Letter from William J.Clinton, President of the United States of America, to the Congress of
the United States of America (Nov. 4, 1993), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 160, 103d Cong.,
IstSess. 1 (1993).
8. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
62 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S 187 [hereinafter GATIT], is a multinational trade agreement between
96 countries. See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACIIONS 19,
252 (1991). It governs the manner in which countries conduct trade amongst themselves. Id.
Originally created to lower tariffs between member nations, it has gone through eight rounds
of negotiations. The most recent round, the Uruguay Round, began in 1987 and has focused
on eliminating nontariff barriers to trade ("NBTs"). Id. NBTs are conditions other than tariffs
that can be used to give the goods of one country a greater competitive advantage over the
imports of another country. The GATT thus enables Parties to challenge the government
subsidies given to another country's producers or a country's inspection standards as nontariff
barriers to free trade. Id. Article XX of the GAIT protects, inter alia, national measures for
health, safety or the environment from attack as NBTs. Id. The national measure must be
legitimately created to attain its health or environmental objective; it will be invalidated if it
is a disguised barrier to trade. Id. For example, Thailand was unable to exclude the sale of
U.S. cigarettes while permitting the sale of domestic cigarettes. Hofgard, supra note 5, at
639. Thailand alleged its need to address health problems as grounds for the attempted exclusion, however, the ban, "which applied unequal standards to domestic products and imports,"
was viewed as a violation of the GAT. Id. It was a "blatant attempt[] to protect domestic
industry from import competition disguised as [an] Article XX measure[]." Id.
9. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement is the precursor to the NAFTA
which reduced tariffs on approximately 400 products traded between the United States and
Canada. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, June 1, 1988, H.R. Doc. No. 100-216,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988) [hereinafter FTA]. The FTA is suspended by the implementation of NAFTA. H.R. REP. No. 361(I), 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1993).
10. The harmonization of laws entails that each Party's laws and technical standards
conform with the other Parties' laws. Through a principle labelled upward harmonization, the
NAFTA provides that a Party need not abandon its tougher standard in order to conform
with the other Parties. Instead the Parties are encouraged to enhance their levels of safety
and environmental protection. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 906(l), at 387; see also REPORT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 8; Duffy, supra note 4, at 587-89.
For a critique of the lowest common denominator problem see Hofgard, supra note 5,
at 651; Michael Hart, Dialogue of the Deaf or Scope for Cooperation?, 18 CAN. U.S. LJ.
207, 223-24 (1992).
11. "[Tlhe concept of sustainable development discourages the use of non-renewable
resources and activities that adversely affect the quality of life for the world's future gener-
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ronmental monitoring and enforcement, and provisions ensuring the
right of parties to set their own environmental agendas. 12 Despite
these advances, the NAFTA came under intense public and special
interest scrutiny on the issues of labor and the environment. t3
This Note examines the subsequent response of the Canadian,
Mexican and U.S. governments to these environmental issues through
the creation of the environmental side agreement. 14 It suggests that
although the NAAEC makes strides toward environmentally conscious
free trade through increased public participation and potentially strong
enforcement measures, the agreement should be amended to grant the
Commission for Environmental Protection ("CEC")-created under the
NAAEC-greater power to investigate violations of environmental
laws. Specifically, Section II provides background information on the
NAFTA and the NAAEC. Section 1H discusses the provisions of the
NAAEC relevant to the CEC. Section IV examines both the powers

and functions of the CEC itself. Finally, Section V analyzes the present effectiveness of the CEC. By contrasting the investigatory power
of the European Community, the section focuses upon the CEC's
power or lack of power to investigate.

ations." Duffy, supra note 4, at 600.
12. NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl., arts. 904(1)(2), 2101(3), at 297, 387, 696; see Duffy,
supra note 4, at 586-88; see also id. at 593-601 (delineating the lacunae present in the
GATT's environmental provisions); Hofgard, supra note 5, at 643-49 (explaining how provisions of the FTA compromise Canada's sovereignty over the use of its natural resources and
the manner in which Canada is restricted should it need to curtail exports of energy resources to the United States).
13. Suzanne Bilello, As U.S. firms set sail for open markets, labor groups predict rough
seas for workers ifthe pact is approved, NEWSDAY, Sept. 28, 1992, at 27; Keith Bradsher,
Trade Pact is Criticized by Gephardt, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1992, at DI; John Holusha,
Trade Pact May Intensify Problems at the Border, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1992, at D6; Robert
Kahn, Loopholes Are the Real Stuff of the Trade Treaty, NEWSDAY, May 17, 1993, at 40;
Tod Robberson, Cloud Over Trade Pact-Texas Too: Mexican Pollution Fuels U.S. Criticism,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at Al.
14. This Note focuses exclusively on the environmental side agreement to the NAFTA.
Contemporaneous to the environmental side agreement, the Parties negotiated an agreement on
labor. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 1499.
The Clinton Administration also completed negotiations with Mexico on a Border
Environment Cooperation Agreement. The Border Agreement establishes two institutions: the
Border Environment Cooperation Commission will plan and manage the construction of infrastructure projects along the border area while the North American Development Bank will
finance the construction of these projects. REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. supra note 7,
at 1.
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II. BACKGROUND

When President George Bush, 5 President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari, 6 and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney" signed the NAFrA
in their respective capitals on December 17, 1992,8 concern remained over the paucity of environmental protection in the
NAFrA.' While the Parties did not reopen negotiations on the text
of the NAFTA, ° they subsequently did create a side agreement and
an environmental commission to address those environmental con-

15. President of the United States (1989-1993), replaced by President William Clinton.
16. President of the United States of Mexico from 1988-1994. The Mexican presidency
has a 6 year term of office. President Ernesto Zedillo was elected August 21, 1994 and took
office December 1, 1994, replacing President Salinas de Gortari.
17. Former Prime Minister of Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney was replaced in 1993
by Prime Minister Kim Campbell (June-Nov. 1993), who was subsequently replaced by Prime
Minister Jean Chr~tien in November 1993.
18. H.R. REP. No. 361, supra note 9, at 7.
19. Many felt the NAFTA had not gone far enough in protecting the environment. The
criticism was raised partially because a union with Mexico, particularly lax in the field of
environmental enforcement, could have been a threat to U.S. environmental practices. REPORT
ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 1-2 (stating that the environmental effects of
the NAFTA had been a concern even before negotiations began, when Congress was considering granting President Bush the authority to negotiate); Steve Chamovitz, NAFTA: An Analysis of its Environmental Provisions, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10067, 10073 (1993); Duffy, supra
note 4, at 562.
In 1991, concern over the environment and North American trade prompted the Bush
Administration to conduct a survey of Mexico's environmental laws. The survey concluded
that while Mexico had a comprehensive set of environmental laws, those laws, for a variety
of reasons, were not being enforced in an effective way. Robert Housman et al., Enforcement
of Environmental Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 593, 594 (1993); see RESPONSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO ISSUES RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEGOTIATION OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, Transmitted to the Congress by the President on May 1,
1991, available in Westlaw, NAFTA database, 1991 WL 434200, at *1; Hustis, supra note 5,
at 607; see also REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at ES-2 to ES-3, 25-26,
35 (delineating the creation or revamping of various governmental programs which have
greatly improved Mexico's environmental enforcement record); U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE'S
OFFICE, REVIEW OF U.S.-MEXmcO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 24, 39 (1992) [hereinafter REVIEW
OF U.S.-MEXICO ISSUES]. The Review notes that while emission levels have not been well
regulated if at all, standards were being implemented by looking to U.S provisions for guidance. It further remarks that Mexico has made great strides in improving its enforcement
program.
NAFTA was also criticized because it lacked provisions for public participation. See
infra note 41; see also infra notes 31, 33-36 and accompanying text (citing provisions of
NAAEC that encourage public education and participation).
20. Stanley M. Spracker et al., Environmental Protection and International Trade:
NAFTA as a Means of Eliminating Environmental Contamination as a Competitive Advantage,
5 GEo. INT'L ENvT. L. REV. 669, 670 (1993).
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cerns.2 President Bush had signed the NAFrA, but it still needed to
be accepted by Congress. Such acceptance greatly depended upon the
approach the Administration would adopt in responding to environmental concerns as addressed in the side agreements. 2 The Clinton
Administration, which took office after NAFTA was concluded but
prior to ratification, was committed to the adoption of an environmental side agreement.' Negotiations between Canada, Mexico and
the United States for the creation of the environmental side agreement
began on March 17, 1993.24 The final text was unveiled August 13,
1993, and President Clinton signed the NAAEC at a White House

ceremony on September 14, 1993.'
III.

PROVISIONS OF THE NAAEC

The objectives of the NAAEC do remedy some of the failures of
other international trade agreements, including the NAFrA, to address

environmental concerns. Although the CEC created under the NAAEC
furthers these objectives to some extent, the ultimate failure of the

Parties to endow the Commission with sufficient investigative power
renders the agreement unequipped to ensure the enforcement of environmental laws.
The NAAEC reflects the severe gap that exists between the

enforcement of Mexican environmental laws and the enforcement of
U.S and Canadian environmental laws.26 Thus, the NAAEC is in21.

REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at ES-1.
22. See Spracker et aL., supra note 20, at 696; NAFTA Supporters Still Lack Votes But

Say Support For Pact is Growing, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) No. 214, at AA-4 (Nov. 8,
1993).
The NAFTA is a non self-executing international agreement. It was implemented pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1)
(1993), and hence did not follow the traditional procedure of two thirds approval by the Senate. For an explanation of NAFIA's procedural posture, see infra note 144.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 361(I), supra note 9, at 7; Duffy, supra note 4, at 562; Bob
Davis, Clash Looms over Scope of NAFTA Panel, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at AI0.

24. 139 CONG. REC. S2980 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1993) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
25. See NAAEC, supra note 6; H.R. REp. NO. 361(I), supra note 9, at 7.
26. Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 959; REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note

7, at 15, 20; see REViEW OF U.S.-MExIcO IssUES, supra note 19, at 38-44. All three countries have comprehensive sets of environmental laws. Mexico enacted the General Ecology
Law in 1988, which enables the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL, previously
known as SEDUE) to enforce environmental laws and regulations. Nicolas Kublicki, The
Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican Environmental Law, and Debt Exchanges for Mexican Environmental Infrastructure Development, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAW 59, 83-84 (1994).

SEDESOL's enforcement efforts were thwarted by inadequate funding. Mexico has attempted
to remedy these financial difficulties by acquiring a World Bank loan. Id. at 84 n.106. In
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tended to encourage the NAFTA Parties-particularly Mexico-to enforce the environmental standards already in place. It does not create
new environmental laws, standards or causes of action.'
A. Preamble and Objectives
The Preamble and Objectives sections establish some of the
provisions that permit the NAAEC to protect environmental concerns
to a greater degree than other international trade agreements. These
sections delineate the broad general principles upon which the Agree-

ment is founded. They link the NAAEC to the NAFTA's goal of
providing enhanced levels of environmental protection. The sections
express the sustainable development and intergenerational equity goals

of environmental measures that simultaneously assure environmental
quality in conjunction with industrialization and economic growth for
future generations.28 The Parties also reaffirm, in deference to state
sovereignty, the right of each nation to exploit its own natural resources pursuant to its independent national environmental policy.29
At the same time, the Parties acknowledge the need to strengthen

cooperation on the development and improvement of environmental
laws and regulatory procedures in the process of avoiding artificial
trade barriers." The Parties state their desire to provide for greater

public participation based on the predicate of a public right to
know.3 This desire, in large part, lies behind the scope and function
light of SEDESOL's short life span, it has accomplished impressive results. Besides entry into
the NAAEC, Mexico and the United States have participated in a number of joint environmental ventures in order to strengthen and train Mexican environmental forces. These efforts
have been formally cemented by the adoption of the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank at the same time as NAAEC entered
into force, See supra note 14.
27. Housman et al., supra note 19, at 616; see also REPORT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 15 (outlining obligations of Parties to enforce existing laws).
28. NAAEC, supra note 6, pmbl., art. l(a), at 1483. This principle is also defined as
sustainable development. For background information see Duffy, supra note 4, at 600.
29. NAAEC, supra note 6, pmbl., art. l(d), at 1483; cf. Hofgard, supra note 5, at 64445 (analyzing Article 904 of the GATT, which does not permit Canada to curtail its exports
of energy sources to the United States without being forced to equally curtail its own consumption).
30. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 1(e)-(f), at 1483; see also id., art. 3, at 1483 ("[Ejach
Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.").
31. The right to know measures, called transparency measures, are intended to ensure
public access to various information and to judicial and administrative procedures for the
enforcement of environmental laws. NAAEC, supra note 6, pmbl., arts. 1(h), 4, at 1483.
These provisions specifically address concerns voiced during the NAFTA negotiations to the
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of the CEC.32
B. Obligations

Consistent with the goal of public participation, each Party, with
respect to its own territory, undertakes periodically to prepare and
make available to the public statements on the state of the environment,33 to advance public education in environmental matters,34 to
promote openly the achievement of environmental goals,35 to publish
for public consultation its laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative decisions,36 and to further scientific research and technological
development.
Each Party commits itself to effectively enforce its environmental
laws and to provide interested persons3" the right to seek action for
a violation of environmental laws through access to administrative,
quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings. 39 The Parties adopt a national-

istic view of enforcement by permitting a country's citizens to sue
only citizens of the same country.

effect that the NAFrA dispute resolution process did not provide avenues of public participation. See Housman et al., supra note 19, at 614 (stating that if the overall NAFTA package is to be successful, the CEC "must serve as a counterweight to NAFTA's highly undemocratic nature"); infra part IlI.C. Under NAFTA procedure, trade disputes between Parties are
conducted in secrecy by national governments, precluding citizen access to information, access
to documents produced from these disputes and the right to have a voice in the proceedings.
ld.
32. See infra part IV.
33. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 2(1)(a), at 1483 (stating that "[e]ach Party shall .. ,
prepare . . . reports on the state of the environment"). In contrast to Article 6(1), which
requires the Council to assess the environmental impact of new projects, Article 2 indicates
that the parties envisioned a general report rather than the creation of procedures for environmental impact statements, which has been placed in the Council's authority through Article 6.
Id.
34. Id. art. 2(1)(c), at 1483.
35. Id. art 2(1)(f), at 1483.
36. Id. art. 4(1)-(2), at 1483. Article 4(2) further provides that "[t]o the extent possible,
each Party shall" make proposed measures available in advance to provide the public an
opportunity to comment. Id. art. 4(2), at 1483.
37. Id. art. 2(1)(d), at 1483.
38. The term "interested person" as used in Article 6. section 1, is not defined under
the NAAEC. Section 2 uses the phrase "persons with a legally recognized interest under its
[a Party's] law" which is also not defined, but which may provide some guidance in interpreting Sections 1 and 3. Id. art. 6(2), at 1484.
39. Id. arts. 5-6, at 1484. These are unprecedented Articles that help set the NAAEC
apart from other trade agreements. REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. supra note 7, at 14;
Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 959.
40. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 6. at 1484; REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra
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C. Debate Over the Scope of the CEC
An examination of the negotiations that led to the creation of the

CEC provides an explanation for its current circumscribed power.
During negotiations over the side agreements, a serious debate
emerged about the role the CEC would play.4 Although in agreement about the overall structure of the CEC, the Parties differed
about the function and authority of the Secretariat.
The United States wanted to create a supranational environmental
administration.4 2 Under the U.S. model, the Secretariat would be an

independent body with investigative powers empowered both to investigate on its own and to investigate complaints brought forth by indi-

viduals and non-governmental organizations. 3

note 7, at 15 ("Such access for citizens includes the right to request action for the enforcement of domestic environmental law, and to sue another person under that party's jurisdiction
for damages."); see infra note 41.
Conversely, a cross-border citizen suit approach would enable, for example, a Canadian national to sue in Mexican tribunals. For a discussion of these two approaches, see
Housman et al., supra note 19, at 607-09. Furthermore, the Parties have agreed to provide
procedurally fair proceedings. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 7, at 1484-85.
41. Discussions over an environmental commission were not first heard while negotiating
the NAAEC. Spracker et al., supra note 20, at 696. In fact, the Bush Administration had
suggested the creation of an environmental commission as a response to criticism that the
NAFTA dispute resolution process did not provide public participation before dispute settlement panels nor require public disclosure of a panel decision. NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
2017(3), at 697; Spracker et al., supra note 20, at 695. Accordingly, the Bush administration
viewed the environmental commission as a forum for the discussion of environmental issues.
Id. However, the Clinton administration advocated a greater proactive role for the environmental commission, diverging from the former Bush Administration and from the views of
the Canadian and Mexican governments. Id. at 696. Amongst other issues, the Clinton Administration proposed that trade sanctions should be imposed if a party persistently and unjustly failed to enforce its environmental laws. Id.; see infra part IV.C.2.
For a discussion of other enforcement proposals, see Housman et al., supra note 19,
at 606-12 (discussing the various options presented for private remedies at the national level,
including a model designed after the Intellectual Property Rights Approach created in the
NAFTA, which enables the nationals of each NAFTA member the right to sue in another
NAFTA country, in which they are not a citizen, to enforce an intellectual property right.
The second model, adopted by the NAAEC, requires each country to provide only its own
citizens the standing to challenge the actions of their government.).
42. Spracker et al., supra note 20, at 697; see Housman et al., supra note 19, at 599600. See generally International Affairs: North American Commission Could not Impose Sanctions under Environmental Group Proposal, 24 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 17 (May 7, 1993) (stating,
inter alia, that the environmental commission in a proposal submitted by environmentalist
groups was empowered to conduct investigations on its own or in response to citizen petitions).
43. Spracker et al., supra note 20, at 698.
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Mexico adamantly opposed the U.S. proposal. Mexico viewed a

supranational enforcement body as an unacceptable infringement of
Mexican state sovereignty. 44 In contrast to the U.S. proposal, the
Canadian and Mexican proposals' did not envision a single Secretariat, but rather enabled each Party to establish its own section. The

Secretariat would aid in the flow of information, providing its national member on the Executive Council with administrative, technical
and operational support.'
Criticism levelled at the final adopted text of the NAAEC equal-

44. See Davis, supra note 23, at A10; Housman et al., supra note 19, at 600; International Developments: Sanctions Allowed Against U.S., Mexico, Fines For Canada Under
Environment Pact, 17 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 965, 967 (Aug. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Sanctions or Fines]; Trade Policy: Baucus Outlines Three-Point NAFTA Plan to Protect Both Jobs
and the Environment, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 187, 187 (Feb. 3, 1993) [hereinafter
Baucus]. For a discussion of international sovereignty, see Hofgard, supra note 5, at 668
n.130 (describing the notion of State sovereignty as a longstanding custom additionally recognized by the United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations). Some U.S. business leaders
were also opposed to the U.S. proposal. Calman Cohen, Vice President of the Emergency
Committee for American Trade, a committee composed of the chief executive officers of
sixty large U.S. multinational corporations, expressed concern over the creation of a supranational enforcement agency. Mr. Cohen felt that a supranational enforcement agency capable
of second guessing national environmental protection agencies violated the prosecutorial discretion traditionally granted to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). International
Developments: Commission Should Ensure Enforcement of Environmental Laws, Kantor Testifles, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 2426, 2426 (Mar. 19, 1993); NAFTA: Kantor Outlines
What U.S. Will Seek in Labor and Environmental Supplements, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
402, 402 (Mar. 10, 1993) [hereinafter Kantor]. See generally Carol E. Dinkins et al., Clean
Water Act Enforcement, C534 A.L.I. 311, 314-15 (1990) (discussing the EPA's prosecutorial
discretion).
45. Canada and Mexico each submitted separate proposals during the negotiations, but as
both countries adopted a similar stance they are treated jointly here. For references to the
separate proposals, see Spracker et al., supra note 20, at 697-98; see also Housman et al.,
supra note 19, at 600-01.
46. Spracker et al., supra note 20, at 697-98. The differences in the role the CEC
would play is further described as follows:
The Secretariat found in the Canadian and Mexican proposals is a bureaucrat that aids in the flow of information ....
The U.S. proposal seeks to employ the [CEC] .. as an adjudicative body
for the resolution of disputes regarding environmental issues. To accomplish this
goal, the U.S. proposal incorporates an independent investigator--the Secretariat.
The Canadian and Mexican proposals desire a [CEC] that aids in the coordination
of environmental policies, the exchange of information, and a formal structure for
consultations in the event of a dispute. Thus the Canadian proposal provides for an
"Independent Enquiry Committee" that can make recommendations when consultations fail, whereas the U.S. proposal provides for a "arbitral panel" to adjudicate
differences when consultations fail.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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ly applies to the proposal of the Canadian/Mexican governments.47
The final text vested the CEC with a more aggressive role than the
largely consultative bodies promoted in the Canadian/Mexican proposal. However, the final text falls somewhat short of the original

U.S. proposal.48 It has been characterized as "fundamentally flawed"

for failing to provide the CEC with subpoena power, rendering the

investigation of complaints an extremely difficult task.49
IV. THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
A. Purpose

The heart of the environmental side agreements is the creation of
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"). 0 Although
the CEC possesses characteristics that justify calling the NAAEC an
unprecedented agreement, its lack of investigative power will render
these attributes of limited efficacy.
The NAAEC created the CEC to facilitate cooperation between
the three NAFTA Parties on environmental and conservation issues. 1

One of the prime functions of the CEC is to harmonize the many
different technical standards that the Parties employ to monitor the

health of their citizens and the condition of the North American environment.5 2 Harmonization under the NAAEC precludes the country
with the lowest standard from becoming the common denominator for
all Parties to the trade agreement. 3

47. Sanctions or Fines, supra note 44, at 966.

48. The final text is analogous to a proposal submitted by Senator Baucus. 139 CONG.
REC. S2980-81 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1993); Housman et al., supra note 19, at 602-03; Baucus,
supra note 44, at 187. Although Senator Baucus did not delineate the Secretariat's investigative power along the nature of the entity bringing the complaint, his suggestion rejected the
creation of a supranational enforcement agency, but did vest a measure of investigative power
in the Secretariat by permitting the Secretariat to act through national environmental bodies
should the need for searches or subpoenas arise. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 14, 21, at
1488, 1490; Baucus, supra note 44, at 187; Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 960; see Housman
et al., supra note 19, at 602-03.
49. Sanctions or Fines, supra note 44, at 966 (Statement by House Representative
Collin Peterson).
50. See supra note 41.
51. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 10, at 1485-86; REPORT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES,

supra note 7, at 16; Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 959.
52. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 10, at 1485-86. The harmonization is to be carried out
along with the Committee on Standards-Related Measures established through the NAFTA.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 913, at 390-91; see supra note 10.
53. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 10, at 1485-86. The principle of upward harmonization
is reiterated in the Preamble to the NAAEC.
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The CEC plays an important role in implementing the mandate

of the NAAEC by providing a forum for resolving disputes over the
enforcement of the Parties' environmental laws.' Additionally, and
perhaps most importantly, the Commission acts as an avenue for
public inquiry and for receipt of public comments concerning the
environmental goals of the NAFTA 5
B. Structure
The NAAEC's emphasis on the availability of public access to
various aspects of its environmental protection agenda is further exemplified in the structure of the CEC. 6 The Commission is comprised of three separate bodies: a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint

Public Advisory Committee."
1. The Council
The Council is the governing body of the Commission. 8 It consists of cabinet level representatives of the Parties.59 The Council

54. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 22-36, at 1490-94; see Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at
959. The CEC Arbitral Panel may also impose monetary fines and trade sanctions if a Party
fails to implement the decision rendered by the Panel at the end of the dispute resolution
process. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
The imposition of trade sanctions for a violation of environmental laws is a novel
provision in trade agreements, and it is one of the provisions that help make NAFIA superior to other trade agreements such as the GATT and the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. See Spracker et al., supra note 20, at 696.
55. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 9(4), 10(5)(a), 12, 14, at 1485-88; REPORT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 19.
56. See generally supra note 41.
57. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 8(2), at 1485. The Joint Public Advisory Committee
includes 5 members from each country. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 16(1), at 1489; REPORT
ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 19. It meets at least once a year, and advises
the Council on matters within the scope of the NAAEC. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 16(4), at
1489. It also provides the Secretariat with technical and scientific information needed for the
preparation of annual or factual reports. Id.; REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note
7, at 19.
Because the Joint Advisory Committee plays a peripheral role in the CEC's function
as an investigator, this Article will contain no further description of the CEC's third body.
58. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 10(1), at 1485.
59. Id. art. 9(1), at 1485. A Cabinet level representative is a senior appointed government official, similar in rank to a country's U.N. Ambassador. Housman et al., supra note
19, at 614.
The U.S. representative will be the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, currently Carol Browner. REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 17.
The Canadian representative is Sheila Copps, Canadian Environment Minister, and the Mexican delegate is Carlos Rojas, Mexican Secretary of the National Institute of Ecology, Ministry
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must meet once annually or more often at the request of any Party in
a special session.' All annual meetings will be conducted in public

sessions. The Council may also decide that any special session will
be conducted in public."

The Council must promote and issue recommendations regarding
public access to information held by the public authorities of each
Party, including information on hazardous materials and activities in

its communities.62 It serves as a forum for the discussion of any environmental matter,' including issues such as pollution prevention,
the protection of endangered species and eco-labeling. 4 It has the
power to establish working groups to address these issues, 65 and it

may make non-binding recommendations to the Parties.' All Council
decisions and recommendations are to be made public unless the
Council or other provisions of the NAAEC otherwise dictate.67 The

Council is a support group for the dispute resolution mechanism
established under the NAFTA through the Free Trade Commission.'

of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDESOL).
60. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 9(3), at 1485.
61. Id. art. 9(4), at 1485.
62. Id. art. 10(5)(a), at 1486. This is a mandatory provision denoted by use of the term
"shall."
63. Id. art. 10(1)(a), (2)(s), at 1485-86; REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note
7, at 17.
64. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 2(a)-Cs), at 1485-86. Eco-labeling is the creation of
labeling standards for environmentally friendly products.
Other designated issues include the comparability of techniques for data gathering,
common approaches for reporting on the state of the environment, the use of economic instruments in reaching environmental objectives and the effect of environmental matters on the
economy, scientific research and the exchange of environmental scientists and officials, the
promotion of public awareness, transboundary environmental issues, such as the long range
effects of air and marine pollutants, the conservation of wild flora and fauna, environmental
emergency preparedness measures, the environmental implications of goods throughout their
life cycle, and approaches to environmental compliance and enforcement. The Council must
also establish procedures for the issuance of environmental impact statements on projects that
have adverse transboundary effects. Id. art. 10(7), at 1486-87; see also supra note 33.
65. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 9(5), at 1485.
66. Id. art. 2(2), at 1483. The Parties shall consider adopting Council recommendations
pursuant to Article 10(5)(b) (limits for pollutants). The above highlighted issues upon which
the Council may issue recommendations do not entail a requirement that the Parties either
implement the Council recommendation or even consider implementing them. However, Article
2 does provide that the Parties themselves must consider most of the issues addressed by the
Council in Article 10(2). Note that the Council's action pursuant to an Article 10(2) recommendation is voluntary as opposed to its mandatory action in Article 10(5), and in contrast to
the Parties' mandatory action pursuant to Article 2.
67. Id. art. 9(7), at 1485.
68. Id. art. 10(6), at 1486; see also REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7,
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2. The Secretariat
The Secretariat69 is an independent body receiving no instruc-

tions "from any government or any other authority external to the
Council."7 Its basic functions, consistent with those of the Council,
are geared toward providing public access to information. The Secretariat prepares an annual report covering the activities of the Commission.7' The report will be released to the public and will include
recommendations on issues the Commission has reviewed and the
status of the compliance efforts of the Parties under the NAAEC
provisions.' The Secretariat may also report publicly on any matter
within the scope of the annual program,73 or brought to its attention

through public submissions.74 It may not, however, report on the
failure of a Party to enforce its environmental laws.75 Furthermore,
the Secretariat is permitted to create a factual record based upon a
complaint from the public that a Party is failing to enforce effectively
its environmental laws.76 After a lengthy validation process, the only

at 11. The Free Trade Commission is established by NAFTA, Article 2001.
69. The Secretariat will be headed by an Executive Director, chosen by the Council for
a three year term. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 11(1), at 1487. The Director will supervise and
appoint the Staff of the Secretariat. I&aart. 11(2), at 1487.
Victor Lichtinger was announced on June 28, 1994 as the first executive director of
the CEC's Secretariat. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Lichtinger headed the Mexican office of
ICF Kaiser, an international environmental consulting firm.
70. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 11(4), at 1487. It does act as a support staff to the
Council. Id. art. 11(5), at 1487.
71. Id. art. 12(1), at 1487.
72. Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(f), at 1487.
73. Id. art. 13(1), at 1487-88.
74. Id. art. 14(1), at 1488.
75. Id. art. 13, at 1487-88; see REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at
18.
.76. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 15, at 1488-89; see REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES,
supra note 7, at 18. Before creating a factual record, the Secretariat must first validate the
complaint. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 14, at 1488. A complaint will be considered if it is in
writing, in a designated language (English, French, or Spanish), if it clearly identifies the
person making the submission, and if it provides sufficient information and documentary evidence to enable the Secretariat to review the submission. The Secretariat must further deem
that the complaint is aimed at promoting enforcement rather than harassing industry. It must
determine if the matter has already been communicated in writing to the relevant authorities
(also indicating the response received from the Party) and if the submission is filed by a
person or organization residing in the territory of the Party. Id. art. 14(1)(a)-(f), at 1488.
Once the complaint has met this first set of criteria, it is then subjected to a second
test to determine whether the submission merits eliciting a response from the Party. Id. art.
14(2), at 1488. The second test will consider whether the person has suffered harm, whether
private remedies under the Party's laws have been pursued, and whether the submission raises

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss2/5

14

Le Priol-Vrejan: The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and the Power to Investiga
19941

ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT

remedy available for a meritorious complaint is to make the factual
record publicly available. However, the record will be made publicly
available only if the Council first approves.'
C. Function
1. Cooperation and Information Requests
In furtherance of the expectation of collaboration upon which the
CEC is based, the NAAEC stresses the importance of mutual coop78
eration and the need to make information available to the CEC.
Article 20 establishes that the Parties shall endeavor to cooperate,
including notifying one another of proposed or actual environmental
measures that may affect the NAAEC.79 Article 21, entitled "Provision of Information," enables the Council or Secretariat to request
information from the Parties in order to compile a report or factual
0
record.'

2. The Dispute Resolution Process

One of the provisions that establishes the NAAEC as a precedent
setting agreement for environmentally conscious free trade is its role
in the resolution of disputes and specifically its power to impose
trade sanctions for the failure of the Parties to enforce their environmental laws." l Since the goal of the NAAEC is the enforcement of
environmental laws rather than the dispension of punitive sanctions,

parties are given every opportunity to correct the problem of nonenforcement s in a process that has been characterized as "attenuated
and tenuous." 3 Once a CEC Arbitral Panel finds that a Party has
matters whose study would advance the goals of the NAAEC. Id. art. 14(2)(a)-(d), at 1488.
A Party is compelled to reply as to whether the matter is subject to a judicial or administrative proceeding. If it is, the Secretariat will proceed no further. However, a Party is not compelled to provide any other information. A Party does so only if it "wishes" to submit additional information. Il art. 14(3)(b), at 1488.
At this point, if approved by a two-thirds vote from the Council, the Secretariat is
permitted to investigate in preparation of a factual record, however, it may only rely on
information publicly available, submitted by the interested person, the Joint Advisory Committee or its own information or that of an expert. Id. art. 15, at 1488-89.
77. Id. art. 15(5)-(7), at 1489 (the Secretariat submits a draft factual record to the Council who may decide by a two thirds vote to make the record publicly available). See generally infra part V.C.
78. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 20, 21, at 1489-90.
79. Id art. 20(l)-(4), at 1489-90.
80. Id. art. 21, at 1490; see infra part V.A.
81. See Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 959.
82. REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs, supra note 7, at 20.
83. Sanctions or Fines, supra note 44, at 966; NAFTA: Some Environmentalists Fault
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not properly enforced its environmental laws, the Party is required to
adopt an action plan to aid in remedying the breach. However, if a
Party refuses to adopt an action plan or if it is later found that the

violating Party has not implemented the proposed action plan,' the
CEC Arbitral Panel may impose monetary fines no greater than $20
Side Deal for What it Lacks Rather Than Provisions, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) *7 (Sept. 14,
1993), available in WESTLAW, BNA database, lED file (describing the reaction of an attorney for the Center for Environmental Law stating that the "complicated procedures leading to
sanctions for lax environmental enforcement are 'absurd. Someday [in] some bizarre set of
circumstances where the planets are aligned' trade sanctions could be imposed."
An aggrieved Party may first request consultations regarding whether there has been a
persistent pattern of failure by the other Party to effectively enforce its environmental laws.
This standard is imposed throughout the dispute resolution process. Article 45 defines "persistent pattern" as a "sustained or recurring course of action or inaction." NAAEC, supra note
6, art. 45(1), at 1494-95. "A Party has not failed to 'effectively enforce its environmental
laws' . . . where the action or inaction in question by agencies or officials of that Party []
reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion" or stems from a bona fide decision to allocate resources for enforcement to environmental matters determined to have a higher priority.
Id. art. 45(1)(a), at 1494. This standard is different from standards previously proposed, including a Canadian proposal which identified a violation by finding a "consistent pattern" of
violation of the NAAEC mandate, defined as a "pattern of reliably documented violations of
a Party's obligation." Spracker et al., supra note 20, at 699 (quoting Inside U.S. Trade, Special Report, at 5-6 (May 24, 1993)).
If consultations are unsuccessful, a Party may then initiate procedures by submitting a
complaint to the other Parties and to the Secretariat. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 23(I)-(2), at
1490. Within twenty days of the delivery of the request, the Council shall convene and endeavor to resolve the matter promptly. Id. art. 23(3), at 1490. The Council may summon
technical advisers, mediation or other dispute resolution procedures, and may make recommendations "as may assist the consulting Parties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of
the dispute." Id. art. 23(4)(c), at 1490.
If sixty days after the Council has convened for recommendations an agreement has
not been reached, a Party may request the creation of an arbitral panel, which will not be
convened unless the Council approves the request by a two-thirds vote. Id. art. 24(1), at
1490. The arbitral panel will consider a matter only if the alleged persistent failure to effectively enforce environmental laws relates to "a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide services" traded between the Parties. Id. It may
also consider a complaint if the goods or services produced compete with goods provided by
nationals of another Party in the territory of the Party complained against. Id. art. 24(l)(b), at
1490. Hence, only complaints relating to trade may be heard by a panel. Blumenfeld, supra
note 7, at 960 (also noting that such a relation to trade is not required for an individual or
non-governmental institution bringing a complaint under Article 14).
The panel presents the Parties with an initial report garnered from the submissions
before it and from expert advice. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 30, 31, at 1492. The report
contains findings of fact and a determination as to whether a persistent pattern of failure to
effectively enforce its environmental laws has occurred. Id. art. 31, at 1492. If it does, the
Party against whom a complaint has been submitted must adopt an action plan to remedy the
pattern of non-enforcement. Id. art. 33, at 1492. A disputing Party is entitled to respond to
the initial report. Id. art. 31(4), at 1492. Sixty days after the presentation of the initial report,
the panel issues its final report. Id. art. 32, at 1492.
84. Id. art. 34, at 1492-93.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss2/5

16

Le Priol-Vrejan: The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and the Power to Investiga
19941

ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT

million for violations occurring during the first year of entry into
force of the NAAEC and up to .007 percent of the total trade between the Parties in subsequent years." If a Party fails to pay a
monetary assessment, the next step varies based upon the nationality
of the party against which the complaint is lodged. If Mexico or the
United States fails to pay a monetary assessment, NAFTA benefits
based on the amount of the assessment may be withdrawn. Canada,
on the other hand, permits a complaining Party to resort to the Cana-86
dian court system for an enforcement of the monetary assessment.

The NAAEC is the first agreement to impose such penalties for the
failure to enforce effectively environmental laws.87 Measures such as
these may assure the compliance of the Parties to a NAAEC ruling,
hopefully resulting in an improvement over the enforcement record of
other international trade union decisions.88

85. Id. annex 34, at 1496; see id. art. 34(4)-(5), at 1493.
86. Id. art. 36, annexes 36(A)-(B), at 1493, 1496-97; see REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES, supra note 7, at 21; Sanctions or Fines, supra note 44, at 965 (explaining that this
distinction is the result of a compromise reached during negotiations. Such a process is feasible because Canadian courts can automatically institute orders issued by the CEC Arbitral
Panel).
87. Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 959, 963.
88. One of the international trade unions that has encountered difficulties in enforcing
its rulings is the European Community ("EC"). The EC, created by the Treaty of Rome, is
comprised of a Council, a Commission, a Parliament and a Court of Justice. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
EEC Treaty]; GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMU-

NITY LAW 50-72 (1993) [hereinafter BERMANN]. The Treaty of Rome has been amended by
the Single European Act, 30 O.J. (L 169) 1 (June 29, 1987) and the Treaty on European
Union, commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty, Feb. 7, 1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 719, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The Maastricht Treaty, Article G(A),
changes the name of the European Economic Community to European Community to symbolize how the union of the Member States has grown beyond merely an economic agreement.
The Court of Justice is charged with interpreting the Treaty. The court may also rule
on Article 169 proceedings which are brought by the Commission against a Member State
once the Commission deems a Member State has failed to fulfill a treaty obligation.
BERMANN, supra, at 69.
Until the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993, the Court of Justice
had no means to ensure that a Party would comply with its ruling although a Party was
compelled to do so by the terms of the Treaty. EEC Treaty, arts. 5, 171, at 17, 75. Hence,
the only remedy available when a Member State failed to comply with a court decision was
to return to the Court of Justice. Case 48/71, Commission v. Italy, 1 E.C.R. 527 (1972),
reprinted in BERMANN, supra at 310; see also BERMANN, supra at 311 n.4. Between 1989
and 1992, the Court of Justice heard 47 environmentally related Article 169 proceedings.
Eighteen of them had still not been complied with by December of 1993, implying that the
Commission would have to institute another court proceeding before gaining a Member
State's compliance. See Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 962 ("Of the 47 environment-related
cases decided by the European Court (1989-92), 18 have still not been complied with.").
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V. THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE
A. The Power of the CEC
The CEC possesses limited powers of investigation; it may not
initiate an investigation on its own, but rather must receive a complaint before being able to acquire information on the alleged violation. 9 Moreover, the NAAEC does not clearly delineate what information the CEC may seek when investigating a complaint or whether
a Party is compelled to respond to a request for information. These
ambiguities may enable a NAFTA Party to bypass a CEC request for
information which would jeopardize the investigative process, limiting
the ability to resolve disputes and making the deterrent effect of trade
sanctions an. empty threat. Other innovative NAAEC goals such as
sustainable development and the enhancement of environmental protection would consequently be unattainable.
The NAAEC contains two separate articles which govern the
power of the CEC to investigate a violation of its provisions.' Article 15 governs the type of information the Secretariat may rely on
when investigating a validated complaint9 ' brought by an individual
or a non-governmental organization ("public complaint"):
In preparing a factual record, the Secretariat shall consider any
information furnished by a Party and may consider any relevant
technical, scientific or other information:
a) that is publicly available;
b) submitted by interested non-governmental organizations or
persons;
c) submitted by the Joint Public Advisory Committee; or
d) developed by the Secretariat or by independent experts. 9
Article 21 enables the Council or Secretariat to request information
The Maastricht Treaty has adopted a scheme of monetary fines to remedy the problems of non-compliance. Maastricht Treaty, supra art. 171, at 292. Unlike the NAAEC however, the Maastricht Treaty does not establish set limits for the imposition of fines or a system for the collection of unpaid fines, which may still make Article 169 rulings unenforceable. Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 963.
89. The CEC does not have the power to initiate a request for information on its own
in contrast to the original U.S. proposal. Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 963; see supra part
HI. Complaints are either brought by individuals and nongovernmental organizations or by a
NAFTA Party. See supra notes 76, 80.
90. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 15, 21, at 1488-89, 1490.
91. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
92. NAAEC, supra note 6. art. 15(4), at 1489.
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from the Parties. Article 21 provides:
On request of the Council or the Secretariat, each Party shall, in
accordance with its law, provide such information as the Council or
the Secretariat may require, including:
a) promptly making available any information in its possession
required for the preparation of a report or factual record, including
compliance and enforcement data; and
b) taking all reasonable steps to make available any other such
information requested.93
However, it is unclear whether this latter article applies to the investigation of all complaints, either publicly brought or initiated by a
NAFTA Party, or whether Article 21 is available merely when investigating the complaint of a NAFTA Party.
A broad interpretation of these articles would enable the Secretariat in the preparation of any factual record to request information
from a Party, and therefore, presumably, from a Party's environmental
enforcement agency.' The Executive Branch adopts the broad interpretation, stating: "[i]n preparing any report, the Secretariat may draw
not only upon public information but also upon information submitted
by the parties."" s

However, this broad construction is not the only interpretation
available, and the ambiguous text creates a situation where it is uncertain what information the CEC may rely on and whether a Party is
compelled to respond. A narrower interpretation is possible because
the two separate and distinct articles governing the manner in which
the CEC may investigate are not cross referenced. Moreover, although
Article 15(4)(d) may provide a window to Article 21,' it may also
be referring to technical or scientific data developed by the Secretariat
independently rather than information obtained from a Party.97 The
second clause of subsection (d), referring to information developed by
an independent expert, demonstrates that the subsection applies to
scientific data which the Secretariat may compile in accordance with
its duties under Articles 11(5) and 13.98 This reading would be sup-

93. Id. art. 21(1), at 1490.
94. Id. arts. 15(4)(d), 21(1)(a), at 1489, 1490; see REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES,
supra note 7, at 19.
95. See REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 19 (emphasis added).
96. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
97. See NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 15(4)(d), at 1489.
98. See id. arts. 11(5), 13, 15(4)(d), at 1487, 1487-88, 1489.
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ported by the first sentence of the section which specifically states
that the Secretariat "may consider any relevant technical, scientific or
other information."' However, the first sentence further notes that
the Secretariat "shall consider any information furnished by a Party."" Whether this clause refers to the type of information envisaged through Article 21 or whether it merely pertains to information
voluntarily disclosed by a Party depends upon the interpretation of the
verb "furnished."
Information voluntarily submitted could preclude the Secretariat
from determining whether a violation had occurred. For example, a
Party could voluntarily submit information of such a vague and unsatisfactory nature as to render the CEC incapable of evaluating the
facts alleged in a public complaint. This could consist of a duplicate
of the public complaint submitted to a national enforcement agency
by the aggrieved individual or non-governmental institution "° and
conclusory determinations made by that agency, providing no inspection results or empirical data upon which to evaluate these conclusions. The CEC would hence be unable to ascertain whether a Party
had failed to enforce effectively its environmental laws because the
CEC is unable to issue subpoenas or to conduct its own investigation.
Furthermore, the data provided by the Party might be of insufficient
help in determining whether a Party had abused its prosecutorial
discretion or whether the complaint was meritless. If it had provided
vague or limited information as a means of hiding a violation of
environmental law, the other NAFTA Parties would be unable to
claim redress since, by "furnishing" some information, the NAFIA
Party allegedly in breach would have closed the only avenue through
which the CEC is able to obtain information.
In addition to the problem raised by the interpretation choice
presented above, the power of the CEC may be curtailed by the subsequent subsections of Article 21 which enable a Party to notify the
Council if it considers a request for information "unduly burdensome. ''" "° The Secretariat must then abide by any limitation the
Council would impose on a request for information. 3 Additionally,
99. Id. art. 15(4)(d), at 1489.
100. Id.
101. A public complaint must go through a validation process before determining whether
the complaint has merit. One element of the validation process requires that prior to initiating
CEC procedures, the entity bringing the complaint has communicated in writing with the
alleged violating Party's enforcement agency. Id. art. 14(1)(e), at 1488; see supra note 76.
102. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 21(2), at 1490.
103. The Council effectuates a request to limit information by voting on the request and
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the Article enables a Party to dodge an information request, even
limited by the above Council decision, merely by providing the Secretariat with its written reasons for refusing to comply with the re-

quest.

4

Therefore, if the Commission is to implement the mandate of the

NAAEC to ensure Parties are enforcing their environmental laws, it
will have to rely substantially on complaints brought by the public or
the NAFTA Parties. 5 Such reliance on outside entities makes the
CEC susceptible to personal and political agendas.

Firstly, the only remedy available under the NAAEC to an individual or non-governmental complainant is to have the factual record
compiled by the Secretariat made "publicly available.... . "[T here is

no recourse to an arbitration panel or imposition of fines."'

7

In

light of the arduous validation process, this lack of remedies may
quell the public's desire to bring a valid complaint. Hence, one
source of investigatory power is severely curtailed.' Secondly, the
history of European environmental enforcement demonstrates that
participating states rarely tend to initiate proceedings against other
Member States.'0 9 Accordingly, political reasons often influence

whether a treaty member will forsake disciplinary actions against
another treaty member found to have violated environmental directives."0 Political agendas, therefore, endanger the last avenue

passing it with a two-thirds vote. Id
104.
2. If a Party considers that a request for information from the Secretariat is excessive or otherwise unduly burdensome, it may so notify the Council. The Secretariat
shall revise the scope of its request to comply with any limitations established by
the Council by a two-thirds vote.
3. If a Party does not make available information requested by the Secretariat, as
may be limited pursuant to paragraph 2, it shall promptly advise the Secretariat of
its reasons in writing.
See id. art. 21(2)-(3), at 1490. There are no further provisions to paragraph 3 which aid in
determining the merit of a Party's reasons for failing to provide information.
105. Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 963.
106. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 15(7), at 1489; Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 960.
107. Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 960; cf. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 24, 36, at 149091, 1493-94 (providing the selection of an arbitral panel and the imposition of fines when
the complaining entity is a NAFTA Party).
108. See Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 963.
109. See id. at 962. Article 170 of the EC which enables a Member State to bring an
action against another Party to the Treaty has only been used once, between France and the
U.K.
110. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 596; French, supra note 5, at 34; Hofgard, supra note
5, at 645-46. In 1991, Mexico, concerned with promoting its environmental image in light of
the impending NAFTA negotiations, elected not to pursue a ruling it had obtained against the
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through which the CEC could ensure enforcement of environmental

laws.
The power to investigate independently is the foundation on
which the enforcement of the environmental laws of the three Parties

is based, without which the goals of the NAAEC cannot be achieved.
If the CEC is unable to conduct an adequate investigation despite
cause to believe that a Party is not enforcing its environmental laws,
it may be unable to develop proof to substantiate the allegations."'
The dispute resolution process is never triggered, and the goals of
enforcement of national environmental laws and sustainable development are not attained. Since the Parties can avoid triggering the dis-

pute resolution mechanism by withholding information, the novel
monetary fine measures may rarely be used as effective enforcement
tools.
B. The European Community Investigatory Model
In contrast to the weaknesses in the NAAEC which have been
described, the European Commission.2 is entitled to investigate on
its own initiative or on the basis of complaints filed by the public,
information received from the Parliament, or information supplied by
Member States."' The ramifications of this power demonstrate the
crucial role the European Community ("EC" or "Community") plays

in the enforcement of environmental laws and establishes guidelines
that could serve as a model for the CEC.

United States from a GATr panel. Ironically, the vague language of the GATT had permitted
Mexico to attack and prevail against provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act which
enabled the United States to restrict the import of tuna from countries whose fishing fleets
incidentally killed twice the number of dolphins as the United States did.
111. As structured at present, the CEC can be blocked in several different ways. On a
public complaint, a Party can comply merely with the letter of the law and provide vague responses to Article 21. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. A Party can also
simply refuse to respond to an information request through Article 21(2)-(3). See id. Various
political reasons could influence a Party not to bring a complaint, see supra note 110 and
accompanying text, or all Parties may be in violation of environmental laws, creating an
incentive not to submit a complaint for fear of calling attention to one's own breach, see
infra text accompanying note 118. Furthermore, the curtailed remedies available for a valid
public complaint indicate that complaints will not be brought whenever a Party has failed to
enforce its environmental laws. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 88.
113. Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 961. Article 213 of the EEC Treaty states: "For the
performance of the tasks entrusted to it, the Commission may collect any information and
verify any matters within the limits . . . of this Treaty." EEC Treaty, supra note 88, art.
213, at 86.
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Independent investigative power provides greater assurance of
enforcement because the Community is able to bypass Member State
inaction and demand compliance with Community directives." For
example, in 1990 a European Parliament investigative team conducted
an inspection of all 12 Member States, taking scientific samples to
determine the status of compliance with Community environmental
laws." 5 The Parliament acted because it was dissatisfied with the
level of Member State deference to Community environmental directives." 6 It hoped that its investigation would "focus public attention
on the lack of compliance with EC environmental standards, and
[would] spur the Commission and the Member States on to actually
do something about it."" 7 The Chairman of the European
Parliament's Environment Committee discussing the report that
prompted the 12 Member State investigation stated: "This report
proves just how much we are at the mercy of bureaucrats in the
Member States regarding the accuracy of the information and how
up-to-date it is.' '". If the CEC is faced with a similar situation, it
will be unable to send out inspectors like the European Parliament,
but rather will be forced to rely on a NAAEC Party bringing a complaint. However, such a complaint would probably never have been
made. All the Member States investigated in 1990 were violating
environmental requirements, and a Member State is not likely to demand an inspection because it would risk revealing its own non-compliance. Similarly, a complaint by a NAAEC Party is just as unlikely
because it will subject its own environmental practices to intense
scrutiny.
Secondly, the action of the EC Member States indicates that
Parties to an international agreement will not always comply with a
request for information despite an obligation to cooperate and act in
good faith. Article 5 of the EEC Treaty requires that the Parties facilitate the Community's task in attaining the objectives of the trea9
ty.1
Moreover, the Vienna Convention imposes upon all members
114. Between 1988 and 1992, despite its limited resources, the Commission brought 192
proceedings against Member States for failure to comply with Community environmental laws.
Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 961 (noting that the Commission only has 10 people to monitor
the implementation and enforcement of all the Community's environmental legislation).
115. Parliament Plans to Establish Committee to Study Compliance with Environmental
Laws, 13 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 320 (Aug. 8, 1990).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. EEC Treaty, supra note 88, art. 5, at 17. Article 5 is a mandatory provision stating
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to all international agreements the obligation to perform in good
faith. 2 Nonetheless, "[a] large number of Member States do not re-

spond, or respond only as briefly as possible, to the Commission's
request for information."'' The Commission has even been refused
permission to send experts to conduct investigations.'22
Finally, the difficulty encountered by the European Community
in enforcing compliance with its environmental norms despite its
broad investigative power provides guidance in tailoring the power of
the CEC to avoid similar difficulties. The power of the Community
has enabled it to bring enforcement proceedings against the Member
States."a Unfortunately, until ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,

the scheme of Community law provided weak measures to ensure
Member State compliance with enforcement action. 24 Such a deficiency can render broad investigative power ineffective since it may

not result in greater enforcement of environmental laws."a
that the Member States "shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's aims." Id.
120. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S.
339, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention is a declaratory
agreement on treaty interpretation and procedure. It reiterates one of the oldest principles in
international law, pacta sunt servanda, that treaties must be observed. GERHARD VON GLAHN,
LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 506 (5th ed.
1986).
121. If a Member State fails to provide requested information, the Commission can bring
an Article 169 proceeding for failure to fulfill the Article 5 obligation to cooperate with the
Commission. See generally Case 33/90, Commission v. Italy, 2 C.M.L.R. 353 (1991) (failure
to provide the Commission with information on waste disposal measures in Campania, Italy);
Case 252/89, Commission v. Luxembourg, 1 C.L.R. 3973 (1991) (failure to provide the Commission with information on Luxembourg's measures and regulations on containers of liquids
for human consumption); Case 374/89, Commission v. Belgium, 3 C.M.L.R. 787 (1991) (failure to provide the Commission with a quarterly report on the prices of crude oil and petroleum products); Case 48/89, Commission v. Italy, I E.C.R. 2425 (1990) (failure to provide
the Commission with information on the disposal of toxic waste); Case 162/89, Commission
v. Belgium, I E.C.R. 2391 (1990) (failure to provide the Commission with information on
the disposal of toxic waste); Case 272/86, Commission v. Greece, I E.C.R. 4875 (1988) (failure to provide the Commission with information on administrative formalities involved in
olive oil imports); Case 240/86, Commission v. Greece, I E.C.R. 1835 (1988), 3 C.M.L.R.
578 (1989) (failure to provide the Commission with information on procedures for corn imports).
122. European Commission Implementation
Report, PARL. EUR.
DOC.
(Doc.
EN/RR/121387) 18 (1992), quoted in Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 961.
123. See supra note 114.
124. See supra note 88. Before ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission
could do nothing but bring a second court proceeding if a Member State failed to comply
with an Article 169 ruling. See Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 962, 963 (stating that although
the amendments made by the Maastricht Treaty are an improvement over the previous compliance procedures, their ambiguities risk to make them ineffective).
125. See generally Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 962, 963.
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Conversely, the NAAEC has already established a detailed penalty system to ensure that a Party complies with a proposed remedial
action plan if a Party fails to enforce its environmental laws. 26
However, unlike the Community, the CEC, because of its limited
investigative powers, does not have the power to bring enforcement
proceedings effectively, which, in turn, render the goals of the
NAAEC less obtainable.' An ideal model would therefore combine
the independent investigative power of the European Community
model with
the efficient enforcement measures incorporated in the
128
NAAEC.

C. The Environmental Protection Agency Model

Although a comparison to the national model provided by an
examination of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") may
not apply in the international context of the three NAAEC Parties, the

standards to which the EPA is held in initiating investigations provide
a framework in planning how to vest the CEC with greater investigative powers. The power of the EPA to investigate consists of obtaining information to determine whether the facts discovered justify

bringing a charge. The focus is not on acquiring information sufficient to prove a violation.'29 The EPA derives its power from various environmental laws. 3 It possesses several investigative methods
with which to develop an environmental case. These include informal

investigations, formal administrative discovery, civil discovery, searches upon criminal probable cause, grand jury investigations and criminal discovery.' Formal administrative discovery enables an agency
126. NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 34-36, at 1492-94 (monetary fine imposed for failure to
adopt a remedial action plan, and subsequently, trade sanctions imposed for failure to pay
monetary fines); see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 111.
128. Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 963.
129. 73 CJ.S. Public Administration Law & Procedure § 76 (1983).
130. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") §§ 8-9, 1314, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(f)-(g), 136(k)-(l) (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") §§ 11,
16-17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2610, 2615-16 (1988); Clean Water Act §§ 308-09, 33 U.S.C. §§ 131819 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA') §§ 3007-08, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6927-28 (1988); Clean Air Act §§ 113-14, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413-14 (1988), amended by
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413-14 (Supp. 1993); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund")
§§ 103-04, 106, 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603-04, 9606, 9609 (1988); see Natalie M. Duval, Note,
Towards Fair and Effective Environmental Enforcement: Coordinating Investigations and Information Exchange in Parallel Proceedings, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 535, 535 (1992).
131. Duval, supra note 130, at 545.
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to inspect and request documents through statutory grants of power. 32 The EPA may carry on searches and may issue subpoenas to
recover evidence, but it may not use these statutory devices in bad
faith.'33 Warrants are required for administrative searches or inspections, notwithstanding the fact that the inspection may be required
under a regulatory scheme."' However, to alleviate the burden of

obtaining a traditional warrant, courts have redefined the standard of
probable cause in the administrative context.'35 Accordingly, courts
will grant an administrative warrant if probable cause is based on

specific

evidence"'

or if is

based on a neutral inspection

scheme. 37
D. Possible Solutions

As its powers are now structured in the side agreement, the CEC
is likely to be incapable of conducting investigations sufficient to
ensure the adequate enforcement of environmental laws.' The environmental goals of the side agreement can better be achieved only if

the CEC is free to investigate independently in the best interest of the
environment rather than being subject to obstruction as now appears
to be the case. The President should reopen negotiations to the

NAAEC in order to amend the agreement so as to enable the CEC to
investigate
independently, in a manner similar to the power of the
9
EC.

13

When amending the NAAEC, the Parties should endeavor to give

132. See statutes cited supra note 130; see also Duval, supra note 130, at 546 (defining
formal administrative discovery).
133. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); Duval, supra note 130, at 546.
134. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537-40 (1967); Donna Mussio, Comment,
Drawing the Line Between Administrative and Criminal Searches: Defining the "Object of the
Search" In Environmental Inspections, 18 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 185, 190-91 (1990).
135. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 545 (1967); see Mussio, supra note 134, at 191, 193 ("probable cause" exists for
administrative inspections of commercial premises where there is a) specific evidence of a
violation, or b) a neutral inspection scheme).
136. For a discussion of what constitutes specific evidence, see Mussio, supra note 134,
at 197-203 (It is unclear the quantum of evidence needed to satisfy the specific evidence leg
of the test, but "courts agree that it is something less than that required to satisfy traditional
criminal probable cause.").
137. Id. at 193 (citing lower court cases as using a two pronged test for the determination of administrative probable cause).
138. See supra part V.A.
139. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 48, at 1495. For a discussion of the procedures involved
in amending the NAAEC, see supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
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the CEC enough investigative power to enable it to enforce the goals
of the NAAEC rather than permitting any Party to frustrate these
objectives by being uncooperative." g Because the CEC will be
working in conjunction with national environmental enforcement agencies, there is no need to endow the CEC with the same power given
to the EPA.' 41 The CEC does need to be able to ascertain independently whether environmental laws are being enforced and whether
national environmental enforcement agencies are functioning properly.
The focus of a CEC request for information or inspection should be
to gather information sufficient to determine whether a complaint
should be brought. These objectives can be achieved if the CEC is
able to monitor the enforcement activities of each Party by sending
out inspectors and acquiring records under formal administrative discovery measures. The CEC should be subject to the same requirement
as the EPA of obtaining a warrant before a search or inspection.'42
The Parties could structure the NAAEC investigation process to enable the Secretariat to send out inspectors once it had obtained the
Council's permission to do so. Such power would prevent the frustration of enforcement activity by non-cooperation.
In the event that CEC inspectors found a violation, they should
notify the national enforcement agency of the infraction and let that
agency conduct its own investigation. The CEC should also be given
the right to subpoena records from national environmental enforcement agencies should such agencies fail voluntarily to provide the requested information. The CEC would thus be able to determine if
adequate action was taken after a violation had been referred to an
agency from a CEC inspection. If action was not taken, the CEC
could then determine whether a national 43environmental agency properly exercised its prosecutorial discretion.

140. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
141. The grant of power to the CEC should be a specific and detailed right to investigate so as to avoid duplicative use of enforcement resources.
142. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
143. Examining the reasonableness of an agency's decision not to take action can also
extend to situations where the CEC receives a Party's vague response in answer to a public
complaint. See supra part V.A.
During the negotiations of the NAAEC, some expressed concern that CEC investigative power would violate the prosecutorial discretion traditionally granted to enforcement agencies. See, e.g., supra note 44. The current provisions of the NAAEC give due deference to
the decisions of a national enforcement agency. Article 45 states:
A Party has not failed to "effectively enforce its environmental law" . . . in a particular case where the action or inaction in question by agencies or officials of that
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Conversely, in light of the sovereignty concerns likely to be
raised at the negotiating table, the grant of power to the CEC should
not encompass powers such as the right to impose civil or criminal
penalties, the right to seize property or the right to shut down commercial facilities. National enforcement agencies are the proper fora
for the use of these necessary enforcement tools. Given the right of
the CEC to initiate an investigation as described above, should the
CEC determine that national enforcement agencies are unjustifiably
failing to enforce environmental laws and not availing themselves of
these methods, it could resort to the NAAEC dispute resolution procedures.
The NAAEC is an executive agreement.'" Like other internaParty:
(a) reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance matters; or
(b) results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in
respect of other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities.
NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 45, at 1494-95.
Unfortunately, the CEC cannot currently examine whether an agency's action or inaction is a "reasonable exercise of their discretion." Subpoena power would only enable the
CEC to carry out what is already provided for in the agreement. See also Housman et al.,
supra note 19, at 619-20 (providing suggestions as to relevant criteria for evaluating the decision not to prosecute).
144. Pursuant to Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the President must obtain the "advice
and consent" of the Senate before a treaty is ratified. An executive agreement is not subject
to this requirement. There are two types of executive agreements. The first is a congressionalexecutive agreement which is concluded with prior authorization or subsequent approval by
the Congress. The second, the sole executive agreement, is concluded under the authority of
the president within the powers generally recognized as vested in the presidential office. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 &

cmts. a-d (1986);
LAW 265 (1989);

LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 490, 495 (5th ed. 1986); JOSEPH M, SWEENEY ET AL., THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1040-41 (2d ed. 1981); see also United States v. Pink, 315

U.S. 203, 552 (1942) (stating that the powers of the President in the conduct of foreign
relations include the power to determine public policy without consent of the Senate); United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (1953), ajfd 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
The NAAEC and the other side agreements are executive agreements that do not
require Congressional approval. H.R. REP. No. 361(I), supra note 9, at 6. The NAAEC was
therefore submitted to Congress as part of the entire NAFTA package to be considered by
Congress in deciding whether to approve the NAFTA implementing bill. Id.
The NAFTA is a non-self executing international agreement. For the NAFTA to take
effect, Congress had to approve implementing legislation. Conversely, a self-executing agreement is an agreement that does not require additional legislation because existing law is
adequate to enable the United States to carry out its obligations under the Treaty. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § Ill cmt. h
(1986). The NAFTA is also subject to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
which governs the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. Specifically, the
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tional pacts, it can be modified by agreement between the Parties. 145
Each Party must be notified of the proposal to amend the agreement. 46 The Parties have a right to take part in the decision to accept the amendment, but are not forced to adopt the proposal to
amend the agreement. 47 If a Party does not decide to adopt the proposal to amend the agreement, the remaining Parties may still adopt
the amendment, provided that doing so does not adversely affect the
14
rights and obligations of the Party that has decided not to join. 1
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the NAAEC has taken great strides in environmental
protection, its failure to properly endow the CEC with investigative
power creates the possibility that a Party can refuse to provide information, effectively thwarting the dispute resolution process and frustrating the goals of the NAAEC. The goals that the NAAEC seeks to
attain can more likely be reached if the Parties agree to reopen negotiations. Procedurally, a well-charted course lies ahead. However, the
negotiations risk being difficult, as Canada and Mexico voice their
concern over creating a supranational enforcement agency violative of
sovereignty rights. Hence, the key to creating a CEC that will be able
to both bring North America into an era of environmentally conscious
free trade and respect the concern of the Parties for sovereignty is to
create an entity of well defined, specifically demarcated powers.
Sandra Le Priol-Vrejan"

NAFTA implementing bill was passed in accordance with the Act's "fast track" approval. 19
U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (1991). The "fast-track" process commits Congress to vote without
amendments or extensive debate. The objectives of implementing legislation through the "fasttrack" method is to produce one bill to be transmitted by the House and Senate as the recommended legislation to implement the trade agreement. S. REP. No. 189, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1993).
145. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 48, at 1495; Vienna Convention, supra note 120, arts.
39-41, at 341-42; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 334 (1986).
146. Vienna Convention, supra note 120, art. 2, at 331.
147. Id. arts. 2, 4, at 331.
148. Id. art. 41, at 342.
* The author expresses her gratitude to Professor James E. Hickey and Professor William R. Ginsberg for their time and valued criticism, to Marcelle L. Vrejan, who by her
actions continually inspires me, and Ronald Rose, Esq., my mentor.
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